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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates how smartphone users perceive switching
from their primary authentication mechanism to a fallback one,
based on the context. This is useful in cases where the primary
mechanism fails (e.g., wet fingers when using fingerprint). While
prior work introduced the concept, we are the first to investigate
its perception by users and their willingness to follow a system’s
suggestion for a switch. We present findings from a two-week field
study (N=29) using an Android app, showing that users are willing
to adopt alternative mechanisms when prompted. We discuss how
context-awareness can improve the perception of authentication
reliability and potentially improve usability and security.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Human-centered computing→ Field studies; Smartphones;
• Security and privacy→ Biometrics.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Users protect access to a plethora of personal data on their smart-
phones, using authentication methods such as knowledge-based or
biometric schemes. However, authentication on mobile devices is
error-prone [10, 18] and perceived as time-consuming – in particu-
lar, because interactions on smartphones are usually short [10].
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Figure 1: We investigate how people use and perceive
context-aware suggestions to switch mobile authentication
mechanisms. This is useful when the primary mechanism
is likely to fail (e.g., wet fingers when using fingerprint).
Beyond improving the security of existing mechanisms [15, 31],
concepts have, hence, been suggested to reduce authentication over-
head (e.g., [4, 13]). One option is to use context, which refers to any
(explicit or implicit) information that characterises the user’s cur-
rent situation [27]. Factors include environmental properties (e.g.,
location), but also human factors [28]. Context can be leveraged to
a) skip authentication in certain situations (e.g., Google Smart Lock
[8]) or b) choose adequate (e.g., biometric) authentication [32].
While related work suggests that this is technically possible [32],
we look into how context-aware selection of authentication is used
and perceived by mobile users in the wild. In a two-week field
study (N=29), we tested an Android application, suggesting users
of fingerprint authentication to switch to their knowledge-based
fallback based on (partly fake) context information. Our results
show that users are willing to switch and found our app helpful
and beneficial in daily use. We discuss possible context factors,
authentication switches and use cases.
2 CONTEXT-AWARE AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we report on results from our literature review on
context-awareness and results of an online survey (N=35) and focus
group (N=5) informing our design of a prototype to suggest switches
to a fallback based on context factors (e.g. rain, see Figure 1).
Adapting mobile authentication based on context is very useful
as we authenticate around 40 times a day [10] in varying con-
texts in daily life [12]. Authentication could thus leverage context-
awareness to be more usable as well as more secure. Several authen-
tication models consider location [11] or proximity [14]. Patented
models consider potential risks as context [30]. Google’s context-
aware authentication on Android, Smart Lock [8], allows users to
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choose contexts in which their phones stay unlocked. Wójtowicz
and Joachmiak [32] presented a generic model that allows choos-
ing the “optimal biometrics” for mobile authentication based on
contextual factors (e.g., no voice biometrics in silent mode).
2.1 Challenges of Daily Authentication
2.1.1 Online Survey. Related work found that fingerprint authen-
tication is sometimes problematic, e.g., while walking, in dark en-
vironments or after using moisturiser [1, 2]. Only artificial envi-
ronments were tested. To understand the contexts in which users
encounter difficulties when authenticating on arbitrary devices, we
conducted an online survey (N=35, 20 female, mean age=28). We did
not limit this to biometrics to get a broad spectrum of experiences.
Respondents were asked to describe any problems they encoun-
tered in as much detail as possible, followed by open-ended ques-
tions about the context of the incident and the perceived reason
behind the problem. We asked for time of day, weather and location
as those might have an impact. Participants were recruited via uni-
versity mailing lists and took part in a raffle for three 20e vouchers.
We discarded one response since it did not contain a problem
situation. In the remaining 34 responses, smartphone-related issues
were predominant (22 out of 34). Themajority of thosewere about is-
sues with lockscreens (14) and fingerprint authentication (12). From
those we identified wet or dry fingers as the main source of failed
authentication attempts, e.g., P30: “When [my] hands are sweaty the
smartphone can’t be unlocked using fingerprint. This mostly happens
in crowded [public] transport.”. Reported contextual causes for wet
or dry fingers were temperature (rain or muggy weather), location
(kitchen, bathroom, or public transport) and activities (walking,
applying moisturiser, washing hands, or exercising).
2.1.2 Focus Group. We conducted a follow-up focus group (N=4, 2
female, mean age=26.3) to further investigate problems with finger-
print and coping strategies. Participants were compensated with
10e. We asked about issues encountered when authenticating using
fingerprint authentication on mobile devices and their coping strate-
gies to overcome said issues. We concluded by collecting feedback
on the idea of leveraging context to suggest switches to fallback.
Named problems were dirty/wet fingers, similar to the online
survey. Reasons were cooking, winter season (dry fingers) and
neurodermatitis. The predominant coping strategy encompassed
repeated scanning of the finger. Other options were registering
multiple fingers, addressing the problematic state (e.g., drying or
moisturising fingers) or using different methods (e.g., a fallback
mechanism). Participants were very positive about the suggested
switches to fallback based on context information. Their design pri-
orities were saving time (e.g., by omitting the manual swipe gesture
to get to the fallback), having visual indication of the currently used
method and receiving (brief) explanations for system decisions.
In addition to confirming the online survey’s results, we found
that switches to fallback mechanisms is not among common coping
strategies due to the required effort. However, participants thought
positively about alleviating the need to actively switch the authen-
tication method. Overall, participants favoured concepts that are
transparent and save time, which aligns with previous work [10, 19].
2.2 Lessons Learnt
From related work we learn that fingerprint authentication is error
prone (e.g., for wet or moisty fingers [2]), as also reported by our
survey and focus group participants. However, switches to fallback
are tedious. We further learn that context can be considered for
authentication (e.g., location, proximity or other sensor values [11,
14, 17, 30, 32]) and that it is technically possible (e.g., choosing
biometric mechanisms based on context [32]). Thus, several novel
authentication mechanisms evolve (cf. this survey [29], examples
include [5, 15]) to counteract threats (such as shoulder surfing [31])
and/or usability issues. Further directions have been suggested [21].
Context factors could be leveraged to further increase usability (e.g.,
use fingerprint when on the go or knowledge in case fingerprint
might fail) or prevent threats (e.g., if possible observers are around,
use fingerprint instead of knowledge). In addition to confirming
prior work, our online survey and focus group show that there is a
need for transparent and straightforward ways to switch to fallback
mechanisms when authentication is not possible due to contextual
factors, such as the user’s state, location or activity.
3 PROTOTYPE: CONTEXTLOCK
As outlined in section 2, we see great potential in leveraging context
to (proactively) suggest switches of authentication methods. As a
prerequisite for this, the aim of our work is to evaluate user per-
ception towards authentication switches in the wild. While related
work showed that choosing an appropriate authentication scheme
based on context is possible [32], it is not known whether users
will follow derived suggestions in the wild. Participants of our focus
group also wished for explanation, which was highlighted by prior
work to be important for intelligent systems in general (e.g., [25]).
Indeed, one of the usability heuristics is to maintain the “visibil-
ity of the system status” [22]. Thus, we also investigated in our
field study if explaining suggested switches to fallback mechanisms
impacts users’ decision to follow this suggestion.
3.1 Field Study
3.1.1 Apparatus. Informed by our survey and focus group we de-
veloped an Android application, ContextLock, to provide sugges-
tions to switch to fallback based on context. Due to Android’s secu-
rity limitations and ethical concerns, we did not replace the lock
screen, but simulated a failed fingerprint authentication attempt
(by showing a fallback screen) after successful user authentication.
We built an Android fallback authentication screen allowing for
PIN [26], pattern, and fingerprint [20] authentication. The presented
fallback was determined by a question in the initial questionnaire
to match participants’ routine. Fingerprint was provided, as we did
not want to force a switch but allow users to retry using fingerprint
(which we found to be a common coping strategy) if they wished.
To acquire the user’s context, we integrated OpenWeatherMap
[23] and Google’s activity recognition API [9]. If no fitting context
data was available, we randomly chose either “Humidity detected”
or “Movement detected” as mock context reason (see Figure 1).
3.1.2 Study Design and Procedure. We designed our study as a two
week within-subject field study with the presence of explanation
for suggested switch to fallback as independent variable (generic
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Figure 2: Procedure of our two week field study, including all data sources.
vs. explained, cf. Figure 2). Dependent variables were participants’
subjective ratings from questionnaires and experience sampling
probes as well as decisions on whether to switch to the fallback.
The study duration was initiated and concluded with a ques-
tionnaire, asking for demographics and a final comparison of the
study conditions. During the study period, participants were pre-
sented with a proposed switch to their fallback four times (average
authentication failures as reported in the initial questionnaire) in
random intervals between 8am and 9pm every day. Explanations
were given depending on the current study condition (see Figure 1),
which would automatically switch midway through the study. After
successful unlock (by either using the suggested fallback or finger-
print) a dismissable experience sampling (ES) questionnaire was
shown with 50% probability. Conditions were counterbalanced.
3.1.3 Participants. We recruited participants via universitymailing
lists and social media. From a total of 42 installations, 29 participants
(12 female) between 18 to 45 years (mean=23.6) completed the field
study. Participants were located in the UK, Central America, Russia
and Italy when using the app. The majority came from Germany.
Participants used PIN fallback (16) and pattern fallback (13).
3.1.4 Limitations. Due to strict battery handling onHuawei phones,
our application was sometimes terminated by the operating system.
To counteract this, we showed an icon in the task bar to indicate
that the app was active and kindly asked participants to manually
restart it if the symbol disappeared. We analysed all records with
at least four (of seven) days of data for each condition.
We decided to trigger our app in certain intervals rather than
triggering based on context factors. Wemade this decision to ensure
consistent data collection, though a real application would do it the
other way round. Furthermore, our sample was self-selected and
biased towards younger European students.
3.2 Results
Data sources were the initial and final questionnaire as well as
experience sampling probes (compare Figure 2). Significance was
determined using Wilcoxon and McNemar’s tests and is reported
at a significance level of p = .05.
3.2.1 Prior Authentication Behaviour. We found the most common
coping strategy (stated by 24 of the 29 participants) with fingerprint
failure to be switching to the fallback after multiple failed attempts.
Less participants would switch immediately (2), try again later (2)
or ignore it (1). Some participants reported lockouts (complete loss
of access to their device) at least once a day (5) or once or more a
week (8). Nine participants experienced lockouts once a month at
most and eleven never encountered this problem. The responses
about perceived fingerprint error frequency were also mixed: Eight
indicated once a day, seven more than once a day or once a week
each, six more than once a week and one less than once a month.
Overall, this shows that fingerprint errors and, in some cases, re-
sulting lockouts are indeed a problem and there is room for current
coping strategies to be improved.
3.2.2 Experience Sampling. After data clean-up, we had a total
of 253 complete sets of experience sampling data for the generic
version and 261 for the explained version. On a 5-point likert scale
(0=strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree) the situational annoyance
level was rated as neutral for both versions (generic: M = 2.02, SD
= 0.976; explained: M = 2.03, SD =1.126). We found no significant
difference between the versions.
Though both were rated about neutral, a significant difference
can be observed for the perceived appropriateness (Z = -3.031, p =
.002). The generic design was perceived significantly more adequate
(M = 2.13, SD = 1.073; explained: M = 1.85, SD = 1.143).
Participants were asked for possible reasons of fingerprint failure
while using the generic version of ContextLock. Overall, wet (74)
and dirty (62) fingers constituted the majority of perceived reasons.
Weather and ambient influences such as rain (5), snow (2), humidity
(14) and heat (14) were indicated as influential factors which is
in line with prior work [32]. Other reasons were “movement” and
“damaged fingers from climbing”. This confirms our survey’s results.
3.2.3 Switching Behaviour. We recorded if participants followed
our suggestion to switch to their fallback mechanism. We collected
645 datasets for the generic (no explanation) and 611 for the ex-
plained design. Users showed no significant differences (p > 0.05)
in following our suggestion with 67.13% (SD= 0.470) and 67.76%
(SD = 0.468) of the cases, respectively.
3.2.4 Overall Rating. Figure 3 shows participants’ overall rating of
the two conditions with regards to understandability, appropriate-
ness, increased success, less failures, annoyance and if they used
the fallback. We found no significant impact of the conditions.
Besides conditional questions, we also asked for overall opinions.
In summary, users found ContextLock somehow helpful (median=4),
thought that the automatic recommendation was beneficial com-
pared to their current lock screen (median=4) and would use a
similar system in the future (median=4). The majority preferred
the explained version (22) over the generic one (6); another six
participants remained undecided.
15 participants made comments about situations in which they
would have wanted ContextLock to activate (but it did not). Reasons
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Figure 3: Responses for each Likert item in the final ques-
tionnaire for the generic (upper)/ explained (lower) version.
were “humid” environments, “wet fingers while walking in the rain”
or “misplacement” of the finger on the sensor. Participants also men-
tioned increased battery usage and a wish to customise ContextLock
to more closely resemble their real lockscreen. Three participants
liked the usability of the app and two commented to have enjoyed
the design. We saw no feedback indicating participants noticed
some of the given reasons being random.
3.2.5 Summary. We found no significant differences between app
versions but giving explanations was overall preferred. Participants
liked the concept and found it useful and worth using in the fu-
ture. This was also reflected in about 67% of the cases in which
participants followed our suggestion and switched to their fallback.
4 DISCUSSION
For current biometric authentication mechanisms, users need to
switch to a knowledge-based fallback in case the primary mecha-
nism does not work (as expected). This takes time and is annoying
to users, as reported in our focus group. We suggest to consider
context to switch authentication mechanisms, not only in case fall-
back authentication is necessary, but on a per use case basis. We
now discuss further aspects of our concept as well as opportunities
for future work.
4.1 Appropriateness of Suggestions
Participants perceived suggested switches significantly less appro-
priate when they were given an explanation. However, this only
holds true for the experience sampling and not the final rating.
We believe the reason for this is the use of fake context informa-
tion (when no real data was available), hampering trust in the sys-
tem [16]. While we did not find significant differences, participants
rated the explained version more understandable and perceived
less failures. It was also rated as the preferred choice. This shows
that participants generally appreciate explanations, though the use
of real context data would be necessary to make the system trans-
parent (as, e.g., suggested by Nielsen [22]). Specific use cases and
related context factors are subject to future work.
4.2 Extending the Concept
From related work, we learn that environmental as well as technical
factors [11, 27, 28, 32] may influence context-aware applications
and, more specifically, the choice of authentication.
4.2.1 It’s Raining vs I’m Tired. We propose to consider not only
technical, but also further human factors. This may, on one hand,
refer to users’ concrete characteristics, as, e.g., hand size has an
influence on accuracy of touch interaction [3, 24]. On the other hand,
more abstract factors like users’ current cognitive and physiological
state may be worth considering when choosing authentication. As
an example, using fingerprint may be more usable than entering a
PIN for switching a song while doing sport. Users who are at home
and tired may as well not want to enter a knowledge-based secret,
but rather rely on their trusted environment.
4.2.2 Socially-Aware Authentication. Frankel and Maheswaran [7]
showed that human social interaction is a feasible authentication
factor, thus also social context could be leveraged for authentication
switches. This may, on one hand, lead to a switch to an easier,
potentially less secure mechanism, if trusted entities are present.
On the other hand, users may want to hand over their device to
someone else. While it is easy to share a knowledge-based secret, a
biometric secret cannot be shared. Context-aware authentication
could thus switch to knowledge-based models if the device is in the
hands of a trusted, but foreign entity.
4.3 System vs User-Initiated Switches
Our prototype suggested the switch to knowledge-based fallback,
but did not force users to do so. However, our participants did follow
the recommendation in the majority of the cases (67%). Other ap-
proaches may provide users with the possibility to choose context-
factors to be considered themselves (compare to, e.g., Google Smart
Lock or aCapella [6]). At the same time, context-aware authentica-
tion could also force the switch of authentication mechanism based
on appropriate factors. This would not leave the choice to switch
to the user, but to the context-aware authentication system.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we presented ContextLock, which helped us to under-
stand users’ willingness to follow (mock) context-aware suggestions
for authentication switches in the wild. From our 14-day field study
(N=29), we found that users appreciated ContextLock’s suggestions
and were wiling to follow them. We suggest to further evaluate
context-aware authentication based on human factors to enhance
both, usability and security, of mobile authentication mechanisms.
Future work could investigate deploying authentication mech-
anisms that are more secure but less usable only when there is a
significant need according to the context (e.g., when a threat, such
as shoulder surfing, is likely).
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